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Beyond Discrimination
Understanding African American Inequality in the Twenty-First Century

Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern

I

n November 2007, two reports by distinguished research centers turned African
American inequality into national news.
Their startling and discomfiting data highlighted both the fragility of African American
success and the widening fault lines that divide African Americans from each other. Impressive and authoritative as the reports are,
they nonetheless remain incomplete because
they do not explain how and why African
American inequality has changed during the
last several decades or the place of gender and
publicly supported work in the new black inequality. These omissions matter because adequate and realistic responses to the issues
raised by the reports require grasping the
sources of the revolutionary changes that have
left blacks at once more and less equal. Black
inequality no longer results from powerful and
interlocking forms of public and private discrimination and oppression. Rather, it is the
product of processes beginning with childhood
that sort African Americans into more or less
favored statuses, differentiating them by class
and gender. This new African American inequality, and the poverty that accompanies it
requires policies that identify key points of intervention and reassert a vigorous role for government in the promotion of economic security
and upward mobility. In this article, we summarize our research findings about the new
African American inequality and comment on
its implications. Readers interested in a more
fully documented version should consult either
our article “The New African American Inequality” in the Journal of American History
(June 2005) or book, One Nation Divisible:
What America Was and What It Is Becoming.
The November 2007 reports by the Pew

Research Center and Brookings Institution describe, respectively, growing values gaps among
African-Americans and the failure of their increased incomes to match white incomes or
assure economic security to their children. The
Pew report concluded that “African Americans
see a widening gulf between the values of
middle class and poor blacks, and nearly fourin-ten say that because of the diversity within
their community, blacks can no longer be
thought of as a single race.” Black respondents
also were less optimistic about black progress
than at any time since 1983; lacked confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system;
and believed that “anti-black discrimination is
commonplace in everyday life”—views that set
them apart from whites. Both blacks and
whites, however, agree that in the last decade
“values held by blacks and whites” have converged. The good news is that “black and white
Americans express very little overt racial animosity.” About eight in ten hold “a favorable
view about members of the other group”; most
think that blacks and whites get along at least
“pretty well”; and “more than 8-in-ten adults
in each group also say they know a person of a
different race whom they consider a friend.”
The Brookings report focuses on economic
mobility. It shows that income gaps between
blacks and whites persist, despite increases
among both groups. This income growth masks
declining incomes for both black and white
men in their thirties whose family incomes rose
only because women’s incomes increased, with
white women’s income growth outpacing black
women’s. In 2004, the median black family
income for people ages thirty to thirty-nine was
58 percent of white family income, or $35,000
compared to $60,000. At first glance, the statistics of intergenerational mobility appear
more promising: 63 percent of black children
earn more than their parents, with incomes
adjusted for inflation. But “a majority of blacks
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born to middle-income parents grow up to have
less income than their parents. Only 31 percent of black children born to parents in the
middle of the income distribution have family
income greater than their parents” compared
to 68 percent of white children from similar
backgrounds. Similarly, a majority—54 percent—of black children born to the poorest
parents remain, themselves, at the bottom of
the economic ladder. For the poorest white
children the proportion—31 percent—is much
lower.
Both the Pew and Brookings reports underscore the persistence of group inequality and
the differentiation of African American social
structure. This pattern reflects what we call
the paradox of inequality. Despite repeated
contractions and expansions in the degree of
economic inequality, throughout modern
American history the income and wealth pyramid has remained durable and steep, with continuities in the distribution of rewards by work,
ethnicity, and gender. Yet, immense individual
and group mobility has accompanied this structural durability. To make the process concrete,
consider this: in the last half of the twentieth
century, the civil rights movement and the
women’s movement swept across the United
States. Although neither reached all its goals,
each gained many of its objectives and, in the
process, transformed the nation and the life
experience of tens of thousands of women and
men. Yet, in the decades of the movements’
greatest successes, Americans became massively more unequal, with, for example, between 1973 and 2004, the real annual income
of the poorest 20 percent of Americans rising
20 percent while that of the wealthiest fifth
soared 73 percent. This coexistence of structural rigidity with individual and group fluidity
is what we mean by the paradox of inequality.

I

nequality, however, has not always
worked in the same way. At the start of the
twentieth century, pervasive, overt racial
discrimination barred blacks from most jobs,
denied them equal education, and disenfranchised them politically. After mid-century,
slowly and sometimes with violent opposition,
the situation of African Americans changed
dramatically. Courts and Congress—prodded
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by a massive social movement, national embarrassment on the world stage during the cold
war, and the electoral concerns of urban politicians—extended political and civil rights. Affirmative action and new “welfare rights”
contributed to the extension of social citizenship—guarantees of food, shelter, medical care,
and education. By the end of the century, legal and formal barriers that had excluded
blacks from most institutions and from the
most favorable labor market positions largely
had disappeared. Black poverty had plummeted, and black political and economic
achievements were undeniable.
Yet, for many people—both white and
black—the sense remained that racism still
pervaded American society, operating in both
old and new ways, removing some barriers but
erecting others. Observers found discrimination in racial profiling by police; verbal slips
by members of Congress; disproportionate poverty, incarceration, and capital punishment;
and in the workings of institutions and public
policies that disadvantaged blacks. Racism,
they maintained, kept African Americans residentially segregated and clustered disproportionately in the least desirable jobs, if not out
of the work force altogether, and circumscribed
their opportunities for education, high incomes, and the accumulation of wealth. Far
more often than whites, African Americans
lived in poverty. Most black children were born
out-of-wedlock, and a very large fraction of
them grew up poor. And in the 1980s and
1990s, some indices of black economic
progress began to reverse direction. In the summer of 2005, television images of New Orleans’
African Americans, segregated in low-lying sections of the city, many without automobiles,
trapped as floodwaters rose, brought home in
a horrible way the persistence and consequences of black inequality and poverty.
Was the glass half empty or half full? Could
past black achievement be projected into the
future or had it stalled, leaving this enduring
categorical inequality rooted deeply into the
soil of American life? This is the question implicit in the Pew and Brookings reports. The
question should not be framed in either/or
terms or answered using a single scale of
progress, for the historic pattern of black in-

AFRICAN AMERICAN INEQUALITY

equality based on social, economic, and political exclusion was in fact largely shattered in
the course of the century, to be rearranged in
a new configuration of inequality. In the early
twentieth century, the sources and results of
America’s black/white divide overlapped with
and reinforced one another. What stands out
about the new pattern of inequality is the cumulative process from which it results and the
internal differentiation that is its product. Inequality among African Americans no longer
grows out of a massive and mutually reinforcing, legal and extralegal, public and private system of racial oppression. Rather, it is a subtler
matter, proceeding through a series of screens
that filter African Americans into more or less
promising statuses, progressively dividing them
along lines full of implications for their economic futures and, in the face of natural disaster, their very lives. The history of African
American experience reflects the paradox of
inequality in twentieth-century America.
Blacks less often acquired a four-year college education; men (but not women) who did
enter remunerative jobs earned less than
whites. With education held constant, in fact,
black women had reached income parity with
white women. Nonetheless, whatever their jobs
or educations, African Americans could not
bundle individual into family earnings as large
as those of whites; more of them were poor;
more men were in prison; they owned homes
less frequently; and the homes they did own
were not worth as much. As a consequence,
they lived in segregated neighborhoods, owned
automobiles less often, died younger, and,
when disaster hit, proved the most vulnerable.
Economic inequality, thus, was a cumulative
process.
The recomposition of the patterns of inequality occurred between the end of the Second World War and the turn of the century.
Although blacks did not reach economic
equality with whites, the configurations of inequality among them had been transformed
irrevocably. A differentiation within African
American social structure—a differentiation
by labor-force participation, industrial employment, occupation, education, income,
wealth, and gender—was one result. While
both black men and women moved into white

collar work, women’s gains outpaced men’s.
Between 1940 and 2000, 63 percent of black
women—an increase from only 7 percent in
1940—compared to 52 percent of black men,
worked at white-collar jobs. Clearly, the expansion of government, education, health
care, and private-sector white-collar jobs
opened a plethora of opportunities seized by
African American women. For black women,
America’s economic transition from manufacturing to service was a source of opportunities gained, not lost. At the same time, the
situation of black men worsened as disturbing numbers found themselves outside the
labor market altogether. For instance, between
1940 and 2000, the proportion of black men
in the twenty-one to twenty-five age group
who were out of the labor force jumped from
9 percent to 34 percent.
It was through this process of differentiation—the accumulation of many small and notso-small distinctions—that black social
structure divided and that black inequality endured despite individual and group mobility.
This is the structural reality that underlies the
Pew report’s discovery of the “widening gulf
between the values of middle class and poor
blacks.”
Even when African Americans, both
women and men, moved into better types of
occupations, they clustered in less prestigious
and well-paid positions. Among professional
and technical workers, for example, black
women were employed more often than white
women as technicians, the lowest rung on the
ladder. Black professional men worked twice
as often as white men in the human services,
the least well-paying branch of the professions.
Group mobility could not overcome the nation’s
most historically durable inequality.
Everywhere, in one way or another, the hand
of government, for better or worse, is evident in
the inequality story—from sanctioned racial segregation, for instance, to legislation supportive
of trade unions and fair wages to civil rights.
But the example on which we want to focus
briefly here is less well known: the facilitation
of African American social mobility.
Many black men found employment in
public and state-related jobs (that is, jobs that
were nominally private but dependent on pubDISSENT / Winter 2008
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lic funding). In 2000, these state-related industries employed 19 percent of black men.
Public and state-related employment proved
even more important for black women: at
century’s end nearly half (43) percent of African American women worked in state-related
industries.

P

ublic employment became African
Americans’ distinctive occupational
niche. The Brown v. Board of Education
Supreme Court decision (1954), which declared school segregation unconstitutional, the
Civil Rights Act (1964), the Voting Rights Act
(1965), and affirmative action policies in the
1960s and 1970s: all built pressure to desegregate work and expand opportunities for African Americans. Racial barriers to employment
crumbled most quickly and widely in staterelated jobs when their numbers exploded in
the 1960s and 1970s as the War on Poverty
and the Great Society escalated spending on
social programs. These were good jobs. They
paid, on the whole, more than private-sector
employment. In 2000, the median income of
African Americans who worked full time in the
public sector exceeded the income of black
private-sector employees by 15 percent for men
and 19 percent for women. Public and staterelated employment, thus, have proved the
most powerful vehicles for African American
economic mobility and the most effective antipoverty legacy of the Great Society. This dependence on publicly funded work also left
African Americans vulnerable. Reductions in
public employment and spending strike them
with special ferocity and undermine their often fragile achievements.
Public employment, more than blue-collar factory jobs, played a key role in lifting
African Americans out of poverty. High
black poverty rates, that is, did not result
from deindustrialization. Aside from Detroit
and Chicago, African Americans did not
find extensive work in major cities in manufacturing and were denied the best industrial jobs. Even where black industrial work
was common, service jobs remained the
core of black urban employment. Black industrial workers, moreover, did not earn
higher wages or work more steadily than
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African Americans employed in other sorts
of work. In a sample of fifteen representative cities in 1949, Buffalo, New York, had
the largest fraction of black industrial workers, except for Detroit, but its black poverty rate was among the highest. In cities with
the lowest black poverty rates, relatively few
African Americans worked in industrial
jobs. Instead, government employment,
which accounted for 60 percent of the variance in black poverty rates across the fifteen cities, reduced poverty and proved the
best predictor of African American poverty
rates. Public employment did more than
reduce poverty by providing steady, wellpaid jobs. African-American access to public employment also signaled increasing
black political influence, which, in turn,
encouraged local welfare bureaucracies to
respond more generously to black need.
Thus, in cities with the highest levels of
public employment more blacks escaped
poverty through public transfer programs—
the size of black public employment explained 33 percent of the effectiveness of
cities’ public assistance programs. Overall,
the correlation between African Americans’
poverty rate and employment in government
was a striking -0.7.

W

hat, then, is the moral of this history of black poverty and inequality
whose consequences the Pew and
Brookings reports highlight so vividly? In his
commentary on the reports (New York Times),
African American scholar Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., rightly observes that the “historical basis for
the gap between the black middle and
underclass shows that ending discrimination, by
itself, would not eradicate black poverty and
dysfunction” (Nov. 18, 2007). But neither is his
remedy, by itself, adequate to the task. “Perhaps
a bold and innovative approach to the problem
of black poverty,” he writes, “would be to turn
tenants into homeowners . . . for the black poor,
real progress may come only once they have an
ownership stake in American society.” For support, Gates points to the huge disparities in
black and white wealth. Economist Edward N.
Wolff found the median net worth of non-Hispanic black households in 2004 to be $11,800
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compared to $118,300 for whites, with most of
the difference accounted for by real estate.
Taking a leaf from Margaret Thatcher’s
book, as Gates suggests, by turning residents
of public housing into homeowners would not
solve the problem. Despite the privatization
of public housing, poverty remains high in Britain. There, social housing, as it is more often
called in Europe, is not restricted to the very
poor as it is in the United States. Its tenants
include many of the employed working class
with incomes sufficient to pay mortgages and
maintenance costs. In the United States,
moreover, a stunning rise in homeownership
has not wiped out black poverty or materially
closed the inequality gap between blacks and
whites. (Between 1940 and 2000, black homeownership increased from 23 percent to 47
percent, still far lower than the 72 percent for
whites, but a major increase, nonetheless.) For
too many African Americans, dispossessed of
their homes by the subprime mortgage catastrophe, homeownership has proved a cruel trap
that has left them worse off than before. Without question, increased homeownership would
increase the assets of a great many African
Americans and help reduce the black/white
gap in wealth. But as valuable as it is in the
long run, equity in real estate does not provide the day-to-day income that buys food,
purchases health insurance, or pays tuition
bills. Jobs with wages high enough to pay a
mortgage, backed by robust social insurance,
are the prerequisites of both a decent life and
secure homeownership. These are what far too
many African Americans lack.
A focus on homeownership or, in fact, on
any single factor, misses the two most important implications of the new African American
inequality. First of all, because inequality is the
result of a series of screens that filter African
Americans into more- or less-favored statuses,
policy interventions are needed at each of the
crucial junctures. A fresh approach would identify policies designed to intervene at each point
where circumstances threaten to propel African Americans through a screen that leaves
them on the path toward more inequality and
poverty. This approach requires an ambitious
agenda that focuses simultaneously on neigh-

borhood, school, and work as well as on the
criminal justice and social welfare systems.
The second lesson from the recent history
of African American inequality is this: in the
last half of the twentieth century, institutions
of the labor market and the state—a combination of vigorous government, active labor
unions, a strong economy, and civil rights legislation—reduced black poverty, lessened the
impact of discrimination, and moved many African Americans into the middle class. Today,
by contrast, huge numbers of African American men remain outside the labor market,
many in prison; poor African American women
are pushed from welfare into low-wage work
that offers scant hope of mobility; labor unions
cover fewer workers; and the assault on government constricts the major source of black
economic security and mobility. When they are
injured on the job, blacks, like all American
workers, face increasingly mean workers’ compensation and unemployment programs. When
they are sick, they are confronted with the welldocumented limits of American health care.
When they want to send their children to college, they encounter steeply rising tuitions at
public universities. But the problems are not
insuperable. Just because the engine of
progress has stalled does not mean that it cannot be restarted. Nor are fiscal constraints an
adequate excuse. The United States is a
wealthy country that can pay for whatever it
truly wants, whether waging an expensive war
or subsidizing the very rich with tax breaks.
Black poverty and inequality, in the last analysis, are problems of national imagination and
will. Surmounting them requires understanding how they work today and finding the resolve to attack their sources. The task is
difficult, but, then, the stakes are very high. •
Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern teach at
the University of Pennsylvania, where Katz is
Walter H. Annenberg Professor of History and
Stern is professor of social welfare and history and
co-director of the Urban Studies Program. They
are co-authors of One National Divisible: What
America Was and What It Is Becoming. The
paperback edition of their book is forthcoming
from the Russell Sage Foundation.
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